Sybil Resistance

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Sybil Resistance is the technical challenge of preventing one human from creating multiple identities. OMXUS solves this through in-person vouching by existing participants.

The Problem

In any identity system, bad actors may try to create multiple identities to:

  • Vote multiple times
  • Claim multiple benefits
  • Attack consensus mechanisms
  • Manipulate reputation systems
  • Game incentive structures

This is called a "Sybil attack" after the book about a woman with multiple personalities.

Existing Solutions and Their Failures

Solution Weakness
Government ID Requires trusted authority; can be forged; excludes undocumented people
Biometrics Centralized storage vulnerabilities; can be spoofed; privacy nightmare
Proof-of-Work Plutocratic — rich can afford more computation
Proof-of-Stake Plutocratic — rich can stake more
Phone numbers Easy to get multiple; requires infrastructure
Social media Easy to create fake accounts
Video verification Deepfakes; doesn't prove uniqueness

The OMXUS Solution: In-Person Vouching

OMXUS identity creation — three in-person vouchers verify a new human, attestations anchored to Bitcoin
OMXUS identity creation — three in-person vouchers verify a new human, attestations anchored to Bitcoin

How It Works

  1. Prospective member finds 3 existing members
  2. They meet in person
  3. Physical co-presence verified (NFC handshake, QR exchange, proximity detection)
  4. Each voucher signs an attestation
  5. Attestations are bundled and recorded
  6. Eventually anchored to Bitcoin

Why In-Person?

In-person verification:

  • Cannot be faked remotely
  • Requires physical presence of a real human
  • Creates accountability — vouchers know who they vouch for
  • Builds real relationships
  • Resists scaling attacks

Voucher Responsibility

Vouchers accept ongoing responsibility:

  • If a vouched participant is a sybil, vouchers' reputation is affected
  • Responsibility propagates: 1/3 to each voucher
  • Creates incentive for careful vouching
  • Self-policing without central authority

Understanding Decentralized Identity

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Technical Implementation

The Vouching Event

When vouching occurs:

  1. Both parties' devices verify proximity
  2. Voucher's ring signs the attestation
  3. Attestation includes:
    • Voucher's DID
    • New member's DID
    • Timestamp
    • Location hash
    • Cryptographic proof of co-presence

Verification Chain

Every identity traces back through:

  • 3 immediate vouchers
  • 9 second-degree vouchers (3 for each)
  • 27 third-degree vouchers
  • And so on...

This creates a web of trust rooted in physical verification.

Bitcoin Anchoring

Periodically, vouching records are:

  1. Aggregated into Merkle trees
  2. Anchored to Bitcoin via RGB protocol
  3. Made immutable and publicly verifiable

Attack Resistance

Collusion Attack

Attack: Three bad actors collude to create fake identities.

Defense:

  • Each bad actor's reputation is at stake
  • Creating fake identities harms their standing
  • Network analysis can detect suspicious patterns
  • Social pressure from their own vouchers

Bought Vouching Attack

Attack: Pay people to vouch for fake identities.

Defense:

  • Vouchers bear ongoing responsibility
  • When fakes are detected, vouchers suffer
  • Cost of reputation loss exceeds payment
  • Pattern detection identifies purchased vouching

Scaling Attack

Attack: Create fake identities faster than detection.

Defense:

  • In-person requirement limits speed
  • One person can only meet so many people
  • Suspicious growth patterns are visible
  • Geographic clustering is detectable

Network Effects

As the network grows:

Increasing Security

  • More vouchers means more verification paths
  • Redundancy increases
  • Attack cost rises
  • Detection improves

Organic Growth

  • Each member can vouch for ~3 new members
  • Growth is bounded by physical meetings
  • Quality is maintained by responsibility
  • Trust builds over time

Comparison to Other Systems

System Sybil Resistance Tradeoff
OMXUS In-person vouching Slower onboarding
Proof of Humanity Video verification Deepfake vulnerability
BrightID Connection analysis Requires social graph
Worldcoin Iris scanning Biometric centralization
Government ID Legal identity Requires state

Why This Matters for OMXUS

One-person-one-token is fundamental to:

  • Fair voting — Each person counts once
  • Honest earning — No double-dipping
  • Real accountability — Actions trace to people
  • Prevention — Universal witness requires real people

If sybils were possible, the entire system would be gameable.

See Also