Sybil Resistance
Sybil Resistance is the technical challenge of preventing one human from creating multiple identities. OMXUS solves this through in-person vouching by existing participants.
The Problem
In any identity system, bad actors may try to create multiple identities to:
- Vote multiple times
- Claim multiple benefits
- Attack consensus mechanisms
- Manipulate reputation systems
- Game incentive structures
This is called a "Sybil attack" after the book about a woman with multiple personalities.
Existing Solutions and Their Failures
| Solution | Weakness |
|---|---|
| Government ID | Requires trusted authority; can be forged; excludes undocumented people |
| Biometrics | Centralized storage vulnerabilities; can be spoofed; privacy nightmare |
| Proof-of-Work | Plutocratic — rich can afford more computation |
| Proof-of-Stake | Plutocratic — rich can stake more |
| Phone numbers | Easy to get multiple; requires infrastructure |
| Social media | Easy to create fake accounts |
| Video verification | Deepfakes; doesn't prove uniqueness |
The OMXUS Solution: In-Person Vouching

How It Works
- Prospective member finds 3 existing members
- They meet in person
- Physical co-presence verified (NFC handshake, QR exchange, proximity detection)
- Each voucher signs an attestation
- Attestations are bundled and recorded
- Eventually anchored to Bitcoin
Why In-Person?
In-person verification:
- Cannot be faked remotely
- Requires physical presence of a real human
- Creates accountability — vouchers know who they vouch for
- Builds real relationships
- Resists scaling attacks
Voucher Responsibility
Vouchers accept ongoing responsibility:
- If a vouched participant is a sybil, vouchers' reputation is affected
- Responsibility propagates: 1/3 to each voucher
- Creates incentive for careful vouching
- Self-policing without central authority
Understanding Decentralized Identity
Technical Implementation
The Vouching Event
When vouching occurs:
- Both parties' devices verify proximity
- Voucher's ring signs the attestation
- Attestation includes:
- Voucher's DID
- New member's DID
- Timestamp
- Location hash
- Cryptographic proof of co-presence
Verification Chain
Every identity traces back through:
- 3 immediate vouchers
- 9 second-degree vouchers (3 for each)
- 27 third-degree vouchers
- And so on...
This creates a web of trust rooted in physical verification.
Bitcoin Anchoring
Periodically, vouching records are:
- Aggregated into Merkle trees
- Anchored to Bitcoin via RGB protocol
- Made immutable and publicly verifiable
Attack Resistance
Collusion Attack
Attack: Three bad actors collude to create fake identities.
Defense:
- Each bad actor's reputation is at stake
- Creating fake identities harms their standing
- Network analysis can detect suspicious patterns
- Social pressure from their own vouchers
Bought Vouching Attack
Attack: Pay people to vouch for fake identities.
Defense:
- Vouchers bear ongoing responsibility
- When fakes are detected, vouchers suffer
- Cost of reputation loss exceeds payment
- Pattern detection identifies purchased vouching
Scaling Attack
Attack: Create fake identities faster than detection.
Defense:
- In-person requirement limits speed
- One person can only meet so many people
- Suspicious growth patterns are visible
- Geographic clustering is detectable
Network Effects
As the network grows:
Increasing Security
- More vouchers means more verification paths
- Redundancy increases
- Attack cost rises
- Detection improves
Organic Growth
- Each member can vouch for ~3 new members
- Growth is bounded by physical meetings
- Quality is maintained by responsibility
- Trust builds over time
Comparison to Other Systems
| System | Sybil Resistance | Tradeoff |
|---|---|---|
| OMXUS | In-person vouching | Slower onboarding |
| Proof of Humanity | Video verification | Deepfake vulnerability |
| BrightID | Connection analysis | Requires social graph |
| Worldcoin | Iris scanning | Biometric centralization |
| Government ID | Legal identity | Requires state |
Why This Matters for OMXUS
One-person-one-token is fundamental to:
- Fair voting — Each person counts once
- Honest earning — No double-dipping
- Real accountability — Actions trace to people
- Prevention — Universal witness requires real people
If sybils were possible, the entire system would be gameable.