Mesh Networks
Mesh Networks are decentralised communication networks where each node can relay data for other nodes. Unlike traditional networks that depend on central infrastructure (ISPs, cell towers, undersea cables), mesh networks route traffic through participant devices, creating resilient communication independent of centralised control. OMXUS uses mesh networking -- primarily Yggdrasil, with LoRa and Meshtastic fallbacks -- as its communication layer, ensuring that the democratic infrastructure cannot be shut down by any single authority.
How Mesh Networks Work
Traditional Network Architecture
[Central Server]
|
+---------+---------+
| | |
[Router] [Router] [Router]
| | |
[User] [User] [User]
Problems:
- Single points of failure: If a router, server, or backbone link fails, all downstream users lose connectivity
- Central control over access: ISPs can throttle, block, or monitor traffic
- Can be shut down by authorities: A government order to an ISP disconnects all users
- Requires infrastructure investment: Towers, cables, and data centres cost billions
- Surveillance by design: All traffic passes through identifiable chokepoints
Mesh Network Architecture
[Node]---[Node]---[Node] | \ | / | | \ | / | [Node]---[Node]---[Node] | / | \ | | / | \ | [Node]---[Node]---[Node]
Advantages:
- No single point of failure: Any node can go down without disrupting the network
- Routes around obstacles automatically: If a path is blocked, traffic finds another way
- Each node extends network coverage: More participants = more reach
- No central authority required: No one entity controls the network
- Censorship-resistant by design: No chokepoint to censor
Key Properties
Self-Healing
When a node fails, the network automatically routes around it:
- Packets find alternative paths through neighbouring nodes
- No manual reconfiguration needed -- routing adapts in real-time
- Network degrades gracefully rather than catastrophically
- Resilience increases with density -- more nodes means more alternative paths
Decentralised
No central authority controls the network:
- No ISP can cut access -- there is no ISP
- No government can issue a shutdown order to a single entity
- No corporation owns it -- the network is the participants
- Censorship requires shutting down every node, which is practically impossible at scale
Scalable
Network grows organically:
- Each new node extends coverage and adds routing capacity
- More participants = more resilience and more bandwidth
- No infrastructure investment beyond individual devices
- Community-built and community-maintained
Mesh Network Technologies
Yggdrasil
Yggdrasil is an encrypted IPv6 overlay network that forms the primary mesh layer for OMXUS:[1]
| Property | Detail |
|---|---|
| Network type | Encrypted IPv6 overlay (runs on top of existing internet or direct connections) |
| Addressing | Cryptographic -- your public key IS your address (200::/7 range) |
| Encryption | Curve25519 key exchange + XSalsa20-Poly1305 authenticated encryption |
| Routing | Spanning tree + source routing via distributed hash table |
| Discovery | Multicast (local) + configured peers (remote) |
| Transport | TCP or UDP |
| Platforms | Linux, macOS, Windows, Android, iOS, OpenWrt |
| License | LGPLv3 (open source) |
How Yggdrasil works for OMXUS:
- Each device generates a cryptographic key pair
- Public key becomes the IPv6 address -- identity IS address
- Devices discover peers automatically on local networks (multicast) or connect to configured peers
- Traffic routes through available connections, finding the shortest path
- All traffic is end-to-end encrypted -- even relay nodes cannot read content
- The network works over internet connections, local WiFi, direct Ethernet, or any combination
Benefits for OMXUS:
| Feature | Benefit |
|---|---|
| Cryptographic addresses | Identity tied to keys, not assigned by authority -- integrates with Decentralized Identifiers |
| End-to-end encryption | Private communication by default -- votes, messages, and identity data are protected |
| Automatic routing | No configuration needed -- devices find each other and route traffic |
| Internet + direct connections | Uses any available transport -- works even during partial internet outages |
| Self-healing | Network survives node failures -- no single point of failure |
| Open source | Auditable -- no hidden backdoors or surveillance capabilities |
CJDNS
CJDNS (Caleb James DeLisle's Network Suite) is an earlier encrypted mesh protocol that inspired Yggdrasil:[2]
- Encrypted IPv6 overlay network (fc00::/8 range)
- Uses Kademlia-based DHT for routing
- Requires manual peering configuration (less automatic than Yggdrasil)
- More mature but less actively developed
- Notable deployment: Hyperboria network
OMXUS chose Yggdrasil over CJDNS primarily for its automatic peer discovery and simpler deployment.
LoRa (Long Range Radio)
LoRa is a low-power, long-range radio technology ideal for mesh fallback:[3]
| Property | Detail |
|---|---|
| Range | 2-15 km (line of sight); 1-5 km (urban) |
| Bandwidth | 0.3-50 kbps (very low -- text only) |
| Power | Extremely low (years on battery) |
| Frequency | 915 MHz (Australia), unlicensed ISM band |
| Cost | $15-50 per node |
| License required | No (ISM band) |
What LoRa can carry:
- Text messages (emergency alerts, community notifications)
- Vote submissions (small data packets)
- Identity verification requests
- GPS coordinates (emergency location)
- Sensor data (environmental monitoring)
What LoRa cannot carry:
- Video or audio streaming
- Large file transfers
- Web browsing
Meshtastic
Meshtastic is an open-source firmware for LoRa devices that creates mesh networks with zero configuration:[4]
- Runs on cheap hardware (TTGO T-Beam, Heltec, RAK devices -- $20-50 each)
- Automatic mesh formation -- devices discover and relay for each other
- Encrypted messaging -- AES-256 encryption
- GPS positioning -- nodes report location
- Long battery life -- weeks to months on a single charge
- Smartphone app -- Bluetooth connection to Android/iOS
Meshtastic in OMXUS:
Meshtastic serves as the last-resort communication layer. When internet is down and Yggdrasil peers are unreachable, Meshtastic-equipped LoRa nodes can still:
- Transmit emergency alerts to nearby community members
- Accept and relay votes as small encrypted data packets
- Verify identity through challenge-response over radio
- Relay messages between disconnected network segments
Comparison of Mesh Technologies
| Technology | Bandwidth | Range | Encryption | Power | Cost | Best For |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yggdrasil | High (internet-speed) | Global (via internet peers) | Curve25519 + XSalsa20 | Moderate (device power) | Free (software) | Primary communication, voting, data |
| CJDNS | High | Global (via internet peers) | Curve25519 | Moderate | Free | Alternative overlay network |
| LoRa/Meshtastic | Very low (text only) | 2-15 km | AES-256 | Very low (battery) | $20-50/node | Emergency fallback, alerts, votes |
| WiFi Mesh | Medium-high | 50-100m per hop | WPA3 | Moderate | $30-100/node | Local area, community hubs |
| HF Radio | Very low | Global (skywave) | None standard | High | $200-1000 | Absolute last resort, global reach |
Disaster Resilience
Mesh networks have proven critical during disasters when centralised infrastructure fails:
Case Studies
| Event | Mesh Solution | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico (2017) | goTenna mesh devices provided peer-to-peer communication[5] | Communication restored for emergency responders when cell towers were destroyed |
| Hong Kong protests (2019) | Bridgefy mesh app enabled peer-to-peer messaging | Protesters communicated despite government internet restrictions |
| Ukraine conflict (2022) | Starlink + local mesh networks maintained connectivity | Critical communication persisted through infrastructure destruction |
| Turkey-Syria earthquake (2023) | Amateur radio mesh networks coordinated rescue | Communication when all commercial infrastructure was destroyed |
| Australian bushfires (2019-2020) | Amateur radio networks provided backup communication | Community coordination when power and cell towers were down |
Why This Matters for Australia
Australia is particularly vulnerable to infrastructure failure:
- Geographic scale: Vast distances between population centres; remote communities depend on limited infrastructure
- Natural disasters: Bushfires, floods, and cyclones regularly destroy communication infrastructure
- Centralised telco market: Three major carriers control nearly all mobile infrastructure
- Single points of failure: Undersea cables connecting Australia to the global internet are few and geographically concentrated
OMXUS mesh networking ensures that democratic participation and community emergency response continue even when commercial infrastructure fails.
Censorship Resistance
Mesh networks are inherently resistant to censorship because there is no central point of control:
| Censorship Method | Traditional Network | Mesh Network |
|---|---|---|
| Court order to ISP | ISP blocks content; users disconnected | No ISP to receive order; traffic routes around blocks |
| DNS blocking | Domain names resolve to blocked IPs | Mesh uses cryptographic addresses, not DNS |
| Deep packet inspection | Government examines traffic at chokepoints | All traffic encrypted end-to-end; no chokepoints |
| Internet shutdown | Government orders ISPs to disconnect | Mesh continues operating on local connections; LoRa provides radio fallback |
| Cell tower shutdown | All mobile communication ceases | Mesh devices communicate directly; LoRa operates independently |
The "Whitlam Test"
The Whitlam Dismissal 1975 demonstrated that centralised systems enable unilateral action against the democratic will. OMXUS mesh networking is designed to pass what might be called the "Whitlam Test": Can any single authority shut this system down?
For a mesh network:
- There is no central server to seize
- There is no ISP to order disconnected
- There is no kill switch to flip
- Traffic routes around any blocked node
- LoRa radio operates independently of all internet infrastructure
- The system degrades gracefully rather than failing catastrophically
OMXUS Mesh Architecture
OMXUS implements a layered communication architecture:
+----------------------------------+
| OMXUS Applications |
| (Voting, Identity, Emergency |
| Response, Governance) |
+----------------------------------+
|
+----------------------------------+
| Layer 1: Yggdrasil |
| (Primary - encrypted IPv6 |
| overlay, full bandwidth) |
+----------------------------------+
|
+----------------------------------+
| Layer 2: WiFi Mesh |
| (Local - community hubs, |
| neighbourhood networks) |
+----------------------------------+
|
+----------------------------------+
| Layer 3: LoRa / Meshtastic |
| (Fallback - text, alerts, |
| votes, identity verification) |
+----------------------------------+
|
+----------------------------------+
| Layer 4: HF Radio |
| (Last resort - global reach, |
| community-operated stations) |
+----------------------------------+
|
+----------------------------------+
| Layer 5: Sneakernet |
| (Physical - USB, QR codes, |
| printed material, hand carry) |
+----------------------------------+
Each layer activates when the layer above it is unavailable. The system is designed so that critical functions (voting, emergency alerts, identity verification) work on every layer, including the lowest-bandwidth options.
Community Mesh Networks
Existing community mesh networks demonstrate the viability of this approach at scale:
| Network | Location | Scale | Years Active | Key Achievement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| guifi.net | Catalonia, Spain | 35,000+ nodes | 2004-present | Largest community network globally; legally recognised as telecommunications operator[6] |
| Freifunk | Germany | 47,000+ nodes | 2003-present | Decentralised community across hundreds of German cities |
| NYC Mesh | New York City | 1,000+ nodes | 2014-present | Community broadband alternative; proved critical during outages |
| Sarantaporo.gr | Rural Greece | 100+ nodes | 2010-present | Connected a rural community with no commercial internet service |
| Althea | Various | Growing | 2017-present | Blockchain-incentivised mesh; nodes earn for relaying |
Technical Details
Routing Protocols
| Protocol | Type | Used By | How It Works |
|---|---|---|---|
| AODV | Reactive (on-demand) | Mobile ad-hoc networks | Discovers routes only when needed; low overhead |
| OLSR | Proactive (table-driven) | guifi.net | Maintains routing tables continuously; faster forwarding |
| Batman-adv | Layer 2 mesh | Freifunk | Operates at Ethernet level; transparent to IP |
| Yggdrasil | DHT-based spanning tree | OMXUS | Builds spanning tree; routes via source routing[7] |
| Reticulum | Cryptographic routing | Nomad Network | Designed for unreliable links; works on any transport |
OMXUS Node Types
| Node Type | Hardware | Function | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal node | Smartphone with Yggdrasil app | Basic participation: voting, messaging, identity | $0 (existing device) |
| Community hub | Raspberry Pi + WiFi AP + LoRa | Local mesh access point; bridges Yggdrasil and LoRa | ~$100 |
| LoRa relay | Meshtastic device (solar-powered) | Extends LoRa coverage; emergency fallback | ~$50 |
| Backbone node | Server with Yggdrasil + multiple uplinks | High-bandwidth relay; IPFS storage; RGB anchoring | ~$500 |
| HF station | Amateur radio station | Last-resort global communication | ~$1,000+ |
Why This Matters for OMXUS
Cannot Be "Whitlam'd"
A mesh network cannot be shut down by any single authority because there is no single authority to shut it down. This is the foundational requirement for sovereign digital infrastructure.
60-Second Emergency Response
The Emergency Response system requires reliable communication that does not depend on commercial infrastructure:
- Alerts must reach nearby responders instantly -- even if cell towers are down
- Mesh ensures message delivery through multiple redundant paths
- LoRa fallback provides radio-based alerting when all digital infrastructure fails
- Each additional community member strengthens the emergency communication network
Universal Participation
Direct Democracy requires that everyone can participate in governance:
- No geographic discrimination -- mesh extends to underserved areas
- No economic barrier to access -- community-built infrastructure
- No corporate gatekeeper -- no ISP can block participation
- Network grows stronger as more people join
Challenges
Bandwidth
Mesh networks typically have lower bandwidth than centralised infrastructure:
- Each hop adds latency
- Shared medium limits throughput
- Video streaming is challenging over pure mesh
- OMXUS mitigation: Critical data (votes, alerts, identity) is kept small. High-bandwidth content (video, large files) uses Yggdrasil's internet-connected mode.
Density
Networks need sufficient node density to function:
- Rural areas may have coverage gaps between nodes
- LoRa bridges longer distances (up to 15 km) but at very low bandwidth
- OMXUS mitigation: Emergency response creates density motivation. Solar-powered LoRa relays are cheap ($50) and can be placed on rooftops to extend coverage.
Adoption
The chicken-and-egg problem: networks need users to be useful; users need networks to join.
- OMXUS mitigation: Emergency response provides immediate personal value (your safety). Community governance provides ongoing civic value. Economic incentives (contract system) reward node operators. Social incentives (community membership) create belonging.
See Also
- Technical Architecture
- Emergency Response
- Direct Democracy
- Decentralized Identifiers
- Whitlam Dismissal 1975
- Main Page
References
- ↑ Sherwin, N. (2024). Yggdrasil Network Documentation. https://yggdrasil-network.github.io/
- ↑ DeLisle, C. J. (2011). CJDNS Whitepaper. https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/blob/master/doc/Whitepaper.md
- ↑ Semtech Corporation. (2023). LoRa and LoRaWAN: Technical Overview. Semtech.
- ↑ Meshtastic Project. (2024). Meshtastic Documentation. https://meshtastic.org/
- ↑ goTenna. (2018). Mesh Networking in Disaster Response: Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria. goTenna Blog.
- ↑ Baig, R., et al. (2015). guifi.net, a crowdsourced network infrastructure held in common. Computer Networks, 90, 150-165.
- ↑ Sherwin, N. (2024). Yggdrasil Network Documentation. https://yggdrasil-network.github.io/